The Prayas ePathshala

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08 December 2023 – The Hindu

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Israel Hamas War

Context:

  • Since the end of World War II, the United States has dominated the region and had started to turn its strategic attention to more traditional adversaries like China and Russia. However, the United States’ goal in maintaining its influence and interests in the region was to strengthen the relationship between Israel and the Gulf Arabs, two key pillars of its regional policy. The outcome of this approach was the Abraham Accords.

An Arab-Jewish united front:

  • A united front in comparatively tranquil West Asia would enable the United States to reallocate resources from the area for use elsewhere. Conversely, Gulf Arabs made their own strategic adjustments to their foreign policy in order to establish a more stable and predictable relationship in the region as a result of the United States’ deprioritization of West Asia. China now has an opportunity as a result.

China’s role:

  • China, which enjoys cordial relations with nations on the other side of the Gulf, acted as a mediator. The deal on Iran-Saudi rapprochement was the outcome. Reacting to the détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the United States strengthened the Abraham Accords.
  • The Biden administration made a significant investment in the negotiations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. It was so optimistic about the chances of a settlement that it introduced the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) idea earlier this year, positioning it as a counter to China’s regional outreach initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and contingent on an Arab-Israel peace agreement. Then followed the Hamas strike on Israel on October 7.

The process of re-zoning Palestine:

  • The Sunni Islamist terrorist organisation Hamas, which has ruled Gaza since 2007, saw these two realignments in a different light. The alliance between Saudi Arabia, a Sunni monarchy that has been leery of Hamas’ form of political Islam, and Iran, a Shia theocratic republic that has long been an ally of Hamas, is a good development for Hamas. However, Hamas considered it a setback that Saudi Arabia was normalising relations with Israel, which has been occupying Palestinian territory since at least 1967.
  • Egypt persuaded the Israelis to sign the Framework for Peace Agreement in 1978, following the Camp David Agreement, and this document served as the basis for the Oslo process in the 1990s. Only following the 1993 signing of the first Oslo Accord did Jordan and Israel sign a peace treaty.
  • However, Israel did not give in to the Palestinians when the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Morocco signed the Abraham Accords in 2020. This was the strongest indication to far that Arabs were prepared to divorce the Palestine issue from their relations with Israel. This helped Tel Aviv in its attempts to localise the Palestine issue, treating it as a minor inconvenience that would not affect the continuation of the occupation.
  • Nobody anticipated that the Benjamin Netanyahu administration, the most far-right in Israeli history, would make concessions to the Palestinians during the negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Thus, it makes sense that one of the objectives of the October 7 Hamas attack was to breach localization barriers, re-regionalize the Palestine conflict, and ultimately destroy the Saudi-Israeli peace initiative.
  • At least 11,500 Palestinians were killed in Israel’s retaliatory assault on the Gaza Strip in the wake of the Hamas attack, the great majority of them were women and children. This ensured that Hamas had achieved its objective, at least temporarily.

The Arab perspective:

  • Israel and the Arabs were prepared to move past the Palestine issue and forge new lines of cooperation. However, following October 7, new regional realities surfaced. The geopolitical whirlwind that is West Asia has once again centred around the Palestine issue.
  • Second, the Arab Street has seen widespread protests in response to Israel’s disproportionate and indiscriminate war on Gaza, which has increased pressure on dictators and monarchs.
  • Thirdly, the Iran factor never goes away. Iran has escalated its pro-Palestine rhetoric and called for collective action against Israel ever since the Palestine issue became re-regionalized, yet its proxies, the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon, have only occasionally attacked Israel. Iran is attempting to unite the Shia and Sunni populations and assert its dominance over the Islamic world.
  • The Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, has reconnected peace negotiations with Israel with the Palestine issue. America and Israel both suffer from this. After all is said and done, the United States may still hold out hope that the circumstances may allow for a relaunch of the Abraham Accords. This is more than feasible.
  • However, one major obstacle remains unclear: what is Mr. Netanyahu’s ultimate goal in Gaza? He has already made it clear that Israeli troops will remain responsible for the enclave’s general security, which implies Israel will retake the territory it left behind in 2005.
  • The United States has suggested that the Palestinian Authority, which already has limited authority over portions of the West Bank, should also assume control of Gaza after the conflict. However, Mr. Netanyahu rejected that idea.
  • Thus, the present surge of violence would simply be the start of a protracted period of conflict if Israel reoccupied the land, which is home to 2.2 million people who live in hardship and misery.

Local dynamics:

  • Even the China-mediated Iran-Saudi reunion was a defeat for the United States. The desire for autonomy among Arab nations has also grown in recent years. Following the conflict in Ukraine, the UAE and Saudi Arabia declined to abide by US sanctions against Russia.
  • Saudi Arabia disregarded demands and directives from Washington and persisted in its Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Plus cooperation with Moscow.
  • China has covert intentions to erect a military base in the United Arab Emirates as part of its growing influence in the Gulf. These modifications in the regional dynamics are being accelerated by the current crisis

Way Forward:

  • Although the geopolitical landscape has completely changed from the early 2000s, when the United States was the only superpower in the region, the situation in Gaza is essentially back to what it was before 2005. Given the United States’ massive military presence in West Asia, Russia and China may not be able to replace America anytime soon, but the expanding influence of other big countries is providing room for more manoeuvrability for regional players.

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