Issues associated with Electronic Voting Machines
EVM: What is it?
- Since 1998, electronic voting machines, or EVMs, have been utilised in Indian elections.
- They are thought to be more accurate and efficient than conventional paper ballots because they are used to electronically record and count votes.
- A control unit and a balloting unit make up an EVM.
- The balloting unit is stored in the voting compartment, and the control unit is kept with the presiding officer.
- Voters select their preferred candidate by pressing the button next to their name.
- After that, the control unit electronically records the vote.
- A Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) device is also included with EVMs.
- The voter may see whose candidate they have voted for on a slip of paper printed by the VVPAT machine.
- The voter can then see the slip once it has been dropped into a clear container.
- Voters can use this to confirm that their vote was successfully recorded.
How can voters’ confidence in electronic voting machines be increased?
- ECI must act with greater integrity and tolerance rather than just making stern declarations that everything is OK. The principal actions that can be taken are:
Improved Auditability and Transparency:
- Make risk-limiting audits (RLAs) a requirement for every election. In order to find any differences, RLAs randomly choose a small portion of EVMs and manually compare their findings with the matching VVPAT slips.
- Promote the creation of open-source software for EVMs so that independent review and validation of the code is possible.
Increasing Outward Security:
- Establish thorough chain-of-custody protocols to monitor the transfer of EVMs from storage to polling places and back, guaranteeing their integrity all along the way.
- To avoid unwanted access or manipulation, strengthen physical security measures at storage facilities and during transportation.
- Make use of security features and tamper-evident seals to identify any unauthorised changes made to EVMs.
Public Education and Awareness:
- Run frequent public awareness campaigns to clear up misunderstandings and foster voter confidence in the system by educating voters about how EVMs and VVPATs work.
- Election officials should receive easily available and thorough training on EVM operation, security measures, and troubleshooting techniques.
Ongoing Investigation and Advancement:
- To improve EVM security, make continuous research and development investments in tamper-proof hardware, strong software, and cutting-edge encryption methods.
- Work together with organisations and specialists in international elections to adopt cutting-edge security measures and exchange best practices.
Handling Issues and Resolving Accusations:
- Provide a responsive and open process to address voter or political party concerns about anomalies in the EVM.
- Investigate any claims of manipulation or tampering thoroughly, making sure that accountability and due process are followed.
The next steps (as advised by the Citizens’ Commission on Elections, which is chaired by retired Justice Lokur):
- Using VVPATs is a common method of making an electronic voting process software independent, at least roughly – assuming that they are, of course, counted.
- Three things are necessary for such dual-voting protocols: VVPATs must be fully voter-verified; electronic and VVPAT tallies must be cross-checked against one another; and a clear procedure must be in place to break ties in the event that the cross-check is unsuccessful.
- Because it lacks a guiding principle for resolving disputes and does not give voters the requisite agency, the ECI’s existing VVPAT technology is not genuinely voter-verified.
- A voter should be able to approve the VVPAT slip prior to the vote being cast, and she should have the opportunity to cancel her vote if there is a discrepancy. This is the proper VVPAT methodology.
- Allowing the voter to collect the VVPAT slip and place it in a box by herself is the only method to accomplish this without relying on buttons and computers.
- There are common strategies to lessen the worry that a voter could attempt to taint the election by casting a fraudulent ballot.
- Lastly, there are tried-and-true procedures known as Risk-Limiting Audits (RLA) that can be used to compare VVPAT counts with the electronic tally.
- There is no statistical justification for the current requirement that five EVMs be audited for each assembly constituency.
- RLA confirms with high confidence that the result that was stated corresponds to the result that would have been obtained by a complete manual count of the VVPATs.
- RLA is likewise effective and, unless the margins are extremely tiny, typically requires significantly less than full count.
- Independent automated sorting and counting systems may also be established, if necessary. Besides, accuracy cannot reasonably take precedence above efficiency.
Way Forward:
- Voter verification is not a true feature of ECI’s existing voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) technology. It would be proper procedure to provide voters the opportunity to approve the VVPAT slip and to cancel before the vote is actually cast.
