20 April 2024 – The Indian Express

Reflecting on the South China Sea

Reflecting on the South China Sea:

• During a visit to Manila in March 2024, the External Affairs Minister of India expressed in a joint statement that India fully supports the Philippines in maintaining its national sovereignty. His remarks came in the midst of the ongoing West Philippine Sea or South China Sea dispute between China and the Philippines, which saw its most violent and difficult year in 2023 due to frequent maritime incidents and diplomatic problems.
• In a joint statement released in 2023, the Philippines and India also urged China to recognise the 2016 International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision in favour of the Philippines and to abide by the rules-based maritime order. These two remarks are a part of a changing strategy that denotes a shift from India’s previous, more circumspect and impartial stance towards the South China Sea.
• India’s stance on the South China Sea has evolved dramatically in recent years, reflecting the country’s larger strategic and economic goals on the international scene. It now supports international maritime law, sovereignty, and sovereign rights in the South China Sea in a more well-articulated manner.

South China Sea:

• Southeast Asia’s South China Sea is a portion of the western Pacific Ocean.
• It is located north of Borneo Island, west of the Philippines, east and south of Vietnam, and south of China.
• The People’s Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam are the neighbouring states and territories, going clockwise from the north.
• It is connected to the East China Sea by the Taiwan Strait and the Philippine Sea by the Luzon Strait.
• It is made up of many islands, atolls, reefs, and shoals. The three most significant are Scarborough Shoal, Spratly Islands, and Paracel Islands.

Relevance:

• Because it forms the Strait of Malacca, which connects the Indian and Pacific oceans, this sea is strategically extremely significant.
• It is a major geopolitical body of water, passing through one-third of the world’s shipping volume and carrying trillions of dollars’ worth of trade, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
• The Philippines’ Department of Environment and Natural Resources claims that this sea is home to one-third of all marine biodiversity worldwide and has rich fisheries that provide Southeast Asian countries with food security.
• Huge amounts of gas and oil are thought to be under the seabed of the SCS.
• It is among the most frequently used waterways in the world. Shipborne trade is estimated to be worth USD 3.4 trillion annually, and it includes the transportation of energy supplies to the US, Japan, and South Korea.

What are the many South China Sea (SCS) ongoing disputes?

Conflicts Regarding Sovereignty:

• China has occupied the Paracel Islands since 1974; Taiwan, Vietnam, and China all claim sovereignty over these islands in the northern portion of the SCS. Taiwan controls Pratas Island, which is also claimed by the PRC.
• Of the roughly 200 Spratly Islands in the southern section of the sea, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam each claim all of them, while Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines claim portions of them. Taiwan holds the largest land features in the island chain, whereas Vietnam holds the most.
• Scarborough Shoal, in the eastern section of the sea, is claimed by China, Taiwan, and the Philippines; China has been in possession of it since 2012.
• The theoretical 200 nautical mile (nm) Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) that five Southeast Asian nations—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam—could claim from their mainland coasts under the 1994 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) overlap with China’s “nine-dash line” and Taiwan’s corresponding “eleven-dash line.”

Conflict over Ocean Freedom:

• The majority of other nations, including the United governments, understand UNCLOS to grant coastal governments the authority to control economic activity inside their exclusive economic zones (EEZs), but not the authority to control overflight and navigation through such zones, including by military aircraft and ships.
• China is one of the few countries that believes UNCLOS gives them the authority to control overflight and navigation by foreign forces across their exclusive economic zones (EEZs).
• State parties are permitted by UNCLOS to assert that the “naturally formed” land features that can “sustain human habitation” and the 12-nm territorial seas and 200-nm EEZs surrounding their coastlines are theirs.
• Naturally occurring land features that are livable yet stay above the waterline at high tide have the right to 12-nm territorial seas; they do not, however, have the right to 200-nm EEZs.
• Risky Situations at Sea:
• The PRC’s military and civilian aircraft have been charged by the US and other nations with engaging in risky manoeuvres in and over the South China Sea (SCS) that endanger other actors in the region.
• In 2021–2022, PRC military ships and planes exhibited a “sharp increase in unsafe and unprofessional behavior,” according to a study from the U.S. Department of Defence (DOD). Some of these actions, according to U.S. officials, were “inconsistent with” bilateral and multilateral agreements China is a party to protecting air and sea safety.

China and Other Claimants’ Tensions:

• Tensions between China and the Philippines have been particularly high over the last ten years. In 2013, following a conflict between Philippine and Chinese ships that resulted in China gaining de facto authority over Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines requested arbitration under UNCLOS regarding PRC operations in the SCS.
• China’s nine-dash line claim had “no legal basis,” according to a 2016 UNCLOS arbitral tribunal, which also found that China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights by interfering with Philippine vessels, causing harm to the maritime environment, and carrying out reclamation work on an area within the country’s EEZ.

China’s Man-made Islands:

• China engaged in massive land reclamation (i.e., island-building) in the Spratly Island chain in the SCS between 2013 and 2015. On the seven contested areas under Chinese control, the reclamation produced artificial landmasses spanning around five square miles.
• China established military installations on the outposts and supplied cutting-edge anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems along with other armaments. Even if other claims have worked on construction and reclamation projects at SCS places they own, China’s militarization and reclamation efforts have fared far better than those of other claimants.

Regional Cooperation Destroyed:

• Since 2002, China and the ten-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been engaged in negotiations to develop a code of conduct for participants in the SCS. A legally binding code, according to some observers, is doubtful, and China has allegedly extended the negotiations to buy itself more time to take steps that will further solidify its position in the SCS.

What is India’s position towards the South China Sea?

Shift in India’s Change:

• India just stated that it took note of the arbitral tribunal’s finding in July 2016, following the announcement of the tribunal’s decision in a case brought by the Philippines against China’s actions and claims in the South China Sea. Given that China has continuously rejected the verdict as “illegal” and refused to acknowledge the tribunal’s authority, it is likely that this was done to avoid taking sides.
• But in 2020, India shifted its position and, together with the Philippines, emphasised the need of adhering to international law and resolving problems peacefully. India has never before suggested following the award, which suggests a substantial change in the country’s formerly “neutral” attitude towards South China Sea issues.

Performing Joint Exercises:

• The Indian Navy conducted joint drills in the South China Sea with the fleets of the United States, Japan, and the Philippines for the first time in May 2019. August of 2021 was the first year of military drills between the Indian Navy and the navy of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Australia, and Indonesia. India sent warships to take part in a two-day joint drill in the South China Sea with the navy of seven ASEAN states for the first time in May 2023.

Enhanced Military Assistance and Sales:

• India has also greatly expanded its military aid and sales to Vietnam and the Philippines. India and the Philippines came to an agreement in January 2022 for the export of 100 BrahMos supersonic anti-ship missiles. Vietnam was the first nation to get a light missile frigate from India that was completely operational in June 2023.

Consequences of India’s Complex Ties:

• It is impossible to separate India’s complicated relationship with China from the development of its stance on the South China Sea. The border issues between the two nations have a long history and have been worse since the 2020 Galwan Valley incident. Beijing has been periodically invading India’s territory and, most recently, has even renamed Indian communities in Arunachal Pradesh.

The Causes of the Change:

The Indian Ocean’s Gateway: South East Asia:

• India’s increased involvement in the South China Sea is driven by three factors: strategic interests, freedom of navigation, and oil and gas resources. Southeast Asia is India’s geographic backyard and entry point to the Indian Ocean.
• India is concerned that the escalating hostilities in the South China Sea could turn into conflicts that would undermine its hegemony in the Indian Ocean. India has so made an effort to strengthen its position in the South China Sea.

Advancing Act-East Policy:

• Under the current administration, India’s policy emphasis has changed from Look East to Act East, signalling a move towards a more active and strategic engagement with the Indo-Pacific region.
• The Act East Policy emphasises not only economic integration but also strategic partnerships and expanded security cooperation with nations in the Indo-Pacific. This evolution of policy reflects India’s recognition of the changing geopolitical landscape and the need for a more proactive and multifaceted foreign policy approach.

Trade Protection:

• India’s trade security is largely dependent on free and secure passage in the South China Sea, as half of its international traffic goes via the strait. Despite the fact that India has no maritime conflicts with China or the ASEAN nations, this is another rationale for its intervention in the South China Sea issue.

Increasing the Variety of Energy Sources:

• In addition to indicating India’s economic ties to the area, its involvement in oil and gas exploration projects in Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and other comparable endeavours demonstrated the country’s support for the UNCLOS and the principle of freedom of exploration and exploitation of maritime resources. Examples of these state-owned enterprises include the overseas arm of the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, ONGC Videsh.

• One “pull factor” that incentivizes India to get engaged in South China Sea issues is the United States. Numerous interests are shared by the two nations. Both are the cornerstones of the Quad, which seeks to advance a global order based on rules. Both share concerns about China’s hegemony in the South China Sea and hold comparable stances about the problems pertaining to the region.
• An accountable partner in the Indo-Pacific region:
• India must now take decisive stances on issues of utmost importance as a responsible participant in the Indo-Pacific region. Because of its pivotal role in the Indo-Pacific region, its periphery now includes not only the Indian Ocean but also a larger maritime region where China’s ascent is upending established order in ways that were not previously anticipated.
• India must support the ASEAN stance because the region is crucial to its Indo-Pacific policy, even though internal divisions within the alliance still make these efforts difficult.

What Future Trends in SCS Are We Likely to See in India?

India will increase its footprint in the South China Sea in three ways in the near future:

India’s Expanding Involvement in the Area:

• India would have a bigger incentive to bolden its regional ambitions through the South China Sea issue because of the rapidly expanding trade and investment linkages, as well as defence cooperation, with the ASEAN members. The South China Sea disputes would become more complex and “internationalised” as a result.

Equalising China’s edge on the Sino-Indian frontier:

• India would keep using its influence over the South China Sea dispute to counterbalance China’s advantages along the Sino-Indian boundary. Indeed, since the skirmishes with China in the Galwan Valley in May 2020, India’s engagement in the South China Sea has escalated significantly. India is likely to use the South China Sea dispute to limit China’s frontier power given the shaky peace along the border and the chilly bilateral relations.

US assistance:

• The United States would assist India in resolving issues in the South China Sea. In the coming years, there will be both stable relations between China and India and an ongoing confrontation between the two countries. India would not hesitate to take advantage of this to benefit from Washington and simultaneously offset China’s rise by working with the United States on the South China Sea issue.

What are the Different Approaches to Reducing the South China Sea Crisis?

Make Use of Economic Options:

• Sanctions on Chinese businesses and individuals engaged in illicit activity, intimidation, and coercion in the South China Sea may potentially be implemented by the US and other claimant nations. It should be made abundantly clear that any military action by China would be met with a forceful American response, utilising all available mitigating measures.

Motivate Other Countries to Unite Against China:

• These concerned countries may work together informally to “name and shame” China for its actions, or they could make official statements and resolutions in forums such as ASEAN or the UN. Additionally, they might temporarily block off areas of the South China Sea with combined military drills.

Impose rules for behaviour in the South China Sea:

• Together with other like-minded countries, the concerned nations might create and implement a code of conduct in the South China Sea. This code of conduct would specify how to handle actions taken by Chinese vessels that are menacing or offensive. These reactions might take the form of buzzing and ramming, or they could take the form of more conventional actions like boarded and captured Chinese boats.

Boost Assistance and Collaboration in Security for Southeast Asian Nations:

• Enhancing the military capabilities of other claimants is necessary in order to monitor activities in the South China Sea and penalise nations that break the established rules of engagement. One such centre would be a networked multinational maritime awareness centre that connects the intelligence gathering and analysis efforts of Southeast Asian nations.
• The United States’ security commitments under the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty were reinforced in 2023 by new Bilateral Defence Guidelines. These guidelines stated that any armed third-party attack against Philippine armed forces, including the Coast Guard, aircraft, or public vessels “anywhere” in the SCS, would trigger the United States’ obligations under the treaty to provide mutual security.

Encourage Talks Regarding Mutual Reduction and Arms Control:

• For instance, the SCS nations could decide to operate further away from China’s island military bases in return for the islands’ total demilitarisation. While secretly pressuring China to abide by international laws and conventions, the United States might collaborate closely with regional organisations.

Promoting Conversation:

• People are realising that a political framework is needed to address the South China Sea issue, and dialogue is the only way to develop one. The leaders of ASEAN should go to “quiet diplomacy” to find a political solution because there is very little chance that legal means will be able to resolve this dispute.
• The onus of developing a legally binding “code of conduct” and establishing a “political framework” is primarily on ASEAN’s leaders. More cooperation amongst ASEAN countries is required if they are to send China a significant political message.

India’s Proposal for an International Maritime Order Based on Rules:

• India has taken a stand against unilateral measures that jeopardise regional stability, as seen by its support for a rules-based international maritime order and its emphasis on UNCLOS. This viewpoint represents India’s positioning as a responsible stakeholder dedicated to regional stability and security, even as it simultaneously subtly opposes China’s sweeping territorial claims and operations in the South China Sea. It is based on India’s principled foreign policy approach.

Maintain FONOPs, But Stay Away From Twelve Nautical Miles of Feature Contests:

• In order to avoid upsetting and upsetting China, the United States and other claimant nations should indicate that the disputed features do not have the same rights as territorial seas with regard to freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) and keep as far away as feasible. It might also keep pressuring China to have its coast guard implement the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea.

Enhancing Capabilities for Maritime Surveillance and Reconnaissance:

• By giving the claimants more time to prepare a concerted defence against China’s attempts to alter the status quo, this action would help dissuade China. These are essentially defensive actions that would provoke Beijing less than offensive ones. Non-traditional security operations such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance also want them.
• In the South China Sea, the U.S. government aims to raise partners’ and allies’ awareness of the maritime area. The SCS was included in the Indo-Pacific region’s improved maritime domain awareness initiative, which was announced by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2022.
• China would likely be concerned as India is expected to utilise a variety of tactics to escalate its participation in the South China Sea. India’s impact in the issues is limited, though. India’s direct involvement in the South China Sea will inevitably be limited due to its lack of strong allies and a military presence in the region, unlike the United States. Furthermore, rather than taking China’s place in the South China Sea, India’s first goal is to continue to rule the Indian Ocean.
• Lastly, India has mostly avoided upsetting China despite standing more and more beside the US and the Philippines in the South China Sea issues. India’s long-standing nonaligned stance and high level of strategic autonomy would prevent New Delhi from working more closely with the United States on the South China Sea issue.