The Futility of Underbalancing China
Introduction:
- One of the most troubling questions the Indian strategic community has had to cope with since 2020 is the reasons for New Delhi’s imbalanced behaviour toward China. Is India’s domestic political climate the only factor that could account for this behaviour?
- How can we explain India’s uneven behaviour in light of China’s threat more specifically? Is it a case of “buck passing,” hoping that someone else would take care of it, appeasing the threat’s real source (China), completely avoiding the matter, or a mix of all three? Will China’s hostility decrease if sanctions are eased?
India’s response to the threat:
- The government and larger Indian strategic community are beginning to recognise China as a threat to India’s national security. As a result of the attention obviously shifting from the Line of Control (LoC) to the Line of Actual Control, a sizable amount of troops has been redeployed (LAC). Additionally, there has been a concerted effort to prevent China and India from working together on technology.
- However, it doesn’t appear that the threat posed by China or potential solutions from India have been fully examined. What is missing is a strong political commitment to containing the Chinese threat. The New Delhi government’s stance on China is similar to closing one’s eyes and acting as if it is nighttime outside.
- Naturally, the fundamental tenet of Indian strategy is the belief that balancing China is dangerous. First off, it is not desired for India to aggressively man the whole LAC with China.
- Second, New Delhi wants to avoid inflaming the situation by retaliating against China because doing so would result in the emergence of new flashpoints along the LAC.
- Thirdly, India’s uneven behaviour is a result of the unpredictability of a military battle with a stronger power.
- However, there are also significant risks connected to the underbalanced China policy that is currently in place. One is that, given the lack of forceful Indian responses, a much more powerful China is likely to accelerate its territorial ambitions. Another facet of underbalancing China is the absence of political clarity regarding the China threat and the articulation of redlines to confront that threat. This then begs the question of what, if anything, India’s allies and partners will do to support India in the case of a conflict with China.
- A sizable school of thinking in New Delhi seems to hold that we should put off building up our ability to resist the China threat. Such a “threat delay” tactic, meanwhile, is based on unjustified optimism because China will continue to surpass India in strength. And by the time India catches up, it would be too late to reclaim the lost territory.
- If there is no clear political articulation, the argument that China might exploit New Delhi’s strategic ambiguity and continue exploring its borders may be plausible. But are unequivocal political declarations about the danger that China poses and the enactment of limits by New Delhi helpful? Sure, theoretically, but there are dangers involved.
India’s future options include the following:
- In other words, there are other “understandable” reasons for the current underbalancing of China strategy, even while domestic political concerns may be prompting the administration to understate the threat posed by China.
What options does New Delhi have to combat the threat posed by China?
Escalation Route
- New Delhi may employ a “tit for tat” strategy and consider occupying unmanned areas on the Chinese side. This is possible, but India needs to be prepared for moves from China that are comparable.
The Path of Economic Resistance
- New Delhi may raise the costs for China economically by restricting high-tech imports from China in some industries.
Nuclear deterrence
- The time may be opportune for New Delhi to consider nuclear upgrading and possibly to develop low yield weapons.
Working together with the West
- China’s aggression does give New Delhi a good reason to strengthen its ties with the West and the United States, despite the veracity of the argument that it is a result of India’s growing strategic collaboration with the United States. We must be more open and truthful about it.
Conclusion:
- It needs to be made apparent how India’s key strategic partnerships and defence contracts will help it should the situation with China get worse. Saying that Beijing will be friendly to New Delhi if New Delhi is patient with Washington is a hazardous assumption disguised as a lax defence. China’s underbalance hasn’t helped, so it’s necessary to devise strategies to counteract the threat that she poses.