Slow Path to Peace in J & K
Current Situation:
- The Union government is reportedly debating a “plan to withdraw the Indian Army totally from the Valley hinterland,” according to a recent report.
- The Army will only be present along the Line of Control (LoC) if approved. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the J&K police could take over control of counterterrorism operations as the Army is pulled out, starting with a few Kashmiri areas.
Army withdrawal from valley due to:
- The decrease in violence in J&K since the decisions made on August 5, 2019, is the driving force behind this decision.
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- This has happened in the past. For instance, two divisions were removed from counterterrorism activities in J&K between 2007 and 2009 and returned to their original function.
- Also, two brigades from Kashmir were transferred to Ladakh to reinforce the deployment near the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
- It will also resolve the labour shortage.
- Also, there are manpower issues for the Army. The two-year moratorium on recruiting during Covid-19 has led to a shortage of roughly 1,20,000 soldiers, and there are no plans to address the gap through fresh recruitment.
- The increased force deployment along the LAC to address the issue that broke up in Eastern Ladakh in 2020 has made the manpower shortage worse. The Army has the chance to properly size its force structure whenever internal security responsibilities are reduced.
- In fact, the Army has been considering this already. The number of RR companies in a unit would be decreased from six to four, and part of the sector and force headquarters would be dissolved.
- Moreover, several RR units have already been deployed along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh. When all of this is considered, the Army’s presence in the hinterland would be significantly reduced.
When pulling the Troops out of the valley, the following variables must be taken into account:
Initially, the timing. Outside Factor:
- Examining the internal and external causes that have kept the issue from being resolved is necessary for determining what constitutes normalcy.
- The outside influence has lost strength. In the past, Pakistan has generously supported terrorism in J&K, but today, it has less power to change the situation.
- This is due to Pakistan’s severe political, economic, and internal security problems, as well as India’s robust response to terrorist acts bearing a Pakistani hallmark.
Internal Factors:
- In order to address internal factors, it is necessary to govern the security situation, combat radicalization, meet the needs of the populace, promote economic development, and resume political engagement.
- Lessons from the past show that the prevalence of violence alone does not represent normalcy. The number of people killed in acts of terrorism was less than half that of 2022 in 2012, but because the root reasons of the conflict in J&K were not addressed, the situation continuously got worse.
- Although the security situation is currently calm, it would be wise to spend some additional time to address the other issues thoroughly. This would guarantee that J&K maintains its stability even if the Army is not present.
Stages in the army’s transition:
- Areas should be turned up to the CRPF gradually. The region of Jammu, where the CRPF assumes full responsibility for counterterrorism activities, could serve as the starting point.
- For any unforeseen circumstances, a small number of RR units could be maintained on hand.
- However, it is not advised to try turning over specific districts in Kashmir because it would lead to concerns with operational integrity, intelligence gathering, and command and control with neighbouring forces acting under different ministries.
Phasing is being recommended for two key reasons:
- Now, the Army, CRPF, and J&K police work in cooperation, with each force bringing its own expertise to the missions. In the case of the Army, these comprise not only the highly trained soldiers but also the logistics, communication, engineering, and medical support that is crucial to the organisation. This competence gap would need to be filled in the absence of the Army, and the initial deployment of the CRPF in the Jammu region could teach important lessons in this respect before they assume duty in the Kashmir valley.
Conclusion:
- The government’s suggestion that the return to normalcy be followed by a decrease in the Army force levels stationed in J&K for counterterrorism operations has some merit.
- This would also come as a relief to the Army faced with manpower cuts even as its operational obligations have expanded. Yet, the achievements in J&K have come at significant cost, and it would be smart to err on the side of caution and perform the pull out of the Army in a graduated and staged manner.
