2+2 Dialogue between India and USA
Context:
- Tomorrow, November 9, India will play host to the US for the second 2+2 ministerial discussion. Lloyd J. Austin and Antony J. Blinken, the US counterparts to Indian Defence and External Affairs Ministers Rajnath Singh and S. Jaishankar, will meet with their Indian counterparts.
The meeting’s current relevance is:
- The present meeting’s agenda aims to further advances in technology, diplomacy, and defence that have already been made.
- Although the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine are pressing matters, China and its revisionist leanings present a more persistent threat for the US and India.
- It is instructive to look at recent events in the South China Sea (SCS) that have placed the Philippines against Chinese intimidation. This is a topic that affects not only the four Quadrant countries (Australia, India, Japan, and the US) but also ASEAN.
- When and how to oppose an assertive China would be a contentious issue that needs to be addressed at the present 2+2 meeting if the projected Quad summit is held in Delhi in January 2024.
Philippines’ resistance to China’s aggression in the SCS:
- Manila claimed on November 2 that Beijing was “intruding” into its portion of the SCS in the current setting.
- China had earlier claimed that a Philippine naval vessel had “illegally entered” the Scarborough Shoal, a body of water that China had unilaterally placed in its ten-dash line. This was in response to that accusation.
- What is believed to have been a planned collision on October 22 in those waters between a Chinese Coast Guard vessel and a Philippine supply boat is what started the present turmoil.
- Each country accuses the other of violating its sovereignty and committing transgressions.
- The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs noted, using unusually strong language, that the Chinese claim had “no legal basis and only serves to raise tensions” in the sea areas that both countries have claimed since 2012.
- Manila filed a case for international arbitration at that point, and Beijing angrily rejected the ruling when the Philippine claim was upheld in the Hague in 2016.
- It then established de facto physical control over its claims in the SCS, which include the contested Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal.
- China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia are among the countries that have filed claims over various parts of SCS.
Philippines and Quad against China:
- The US might become involved in this conflict and thereby broaden its scope if the existing circumstances were to worsen—either intentionally or accidentally.
- This is a dire situation that needs to be avoided since a war between the US and China would be extremely expensive for the entire globe and would worsen the already dire state of international security.
- Manila, a US ally throughout the Cold War, has moved closer to China during the past ten years as a result of internal political developments during President Duterte’s administration.
- As a result, Manila tried to minimise Chinese claims and their increasingly assertive behaviour in the Scarborough Shoals and the Spratly Islands, while remaining silent about the 2016 award.
- But under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the Philippines is gradually separating from China and has rekindled military ties with the United States, including reciprocal naval drills.
- Despite becoming a catchphrase, the normative reference to a FOIP and respect for international law is still merely rhetorical and an illusive goal in the face of China’s aggression in the South China Sea.
- India supports this concept as well, albeit it has refrained from specifically calling out China.
- In his June speech to Congress, Prime Minister Modi stated, “The Indo-Pacific region is being shadowed by the dark clouds of coercion and confrontation.”
Security strategists’ dilemma when it comes to China:
- China’s commercial dependency and security-strategic divergence present a conundrum for its conversations.
- Beijing launched an expensive economic boycott against Australia when Canberra retaliated against Chinese meddling in its internal affairs, forcing Canberra to mend its relations with China.
- The Philippines might run into this problem.
- Beijing is unyielding in all areas; India faces a similar dilemma, and the Galwan setback must be handled with the massive trade imbalance (of $77 billion) in China’s advantage.
- Either the highway or the Chinese way applies.
The next step:
- The trilateral alliance between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) is one such emerging project that offers alternatives to counter Chinese bellicosity in the maritime domain.
- The “Malacca dilemma” in China may offer ways to enforce compliance through coercion, but these will need to be carefully and cooperatively calibrated.
- It is difficult for policy makers to decide how much to tolerate or satisfy Beijing’s intimidation.
- No other country has been as willing as the US, despite the fact that it has expressed its support for the Philippines and reiterated its “iron-clad” defence commitment.
- Conclusion: The nature and scope of each country’s bilateral relationship with India will ultimately determine how the US and China dispute is resolved, and the present 2 + 2 meeting that will precede the Quad summit may serve as a significant catalyst.
