India’s Nuclear Diplomacy

Introduction

Since 2005, when India signed a nuclear agreement with the United States (US), the country has made nuclear cooperation with other countries a significant aspect of its diplomatic initiatives. At present, India has civil nuclear agreements with 14 countries that vary in letter and spirit. India holds the potential to expand this sector immensely by strengthening its current partnerships and forging new ones. This is required in order to supplement its growing energy demands while asserting its leadership position in the changing global order. After all, India’s rise in the geopolitical sphere is encouraged partly by its deeper involvement in the nuclear energy sector and has facilitated its presence in the global civil nuclear framework.

India’s civil nuclear agreements have been crucial in according credibility to its status as a responsible nuclear power. To articulate the future of India’s civil nuclear energy cooperation, it is important to recognise the exceptional record that India holds in the global civil nuclear domain, given its status as a non-signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (or the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) and its non-membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). 

In an energy-starved world, the potential of nuclear energy to be an important and cleaner option in India’s energy basket must be recognised. India currently runs 22 nuclear reactors with an operational capacity of 6,780 MW which is just 1.97 percent of India’s total capacity of 344 Gigawatts. Nuclear power holds significant potential to sustain the country’s growing energy requirements; it also provides India with a leverage within the international nuclear energy framework.

This brief examines the likely scenarios for the future of India’s nuclear cooperation with other countries. It analyses India’s current civil nuclear agreements and articulates their potential to improve India’s position in the world as a responsible nuclear power. The brief also outlines avenues where India can push forth similar agreements through the various lessons offered by its experience with past agreements. The brief first examines India’s engagements in the global nuclear energy sector by studying the agreements in detail and offering a nuanced understanding of those interactions. Such interactions with key nuclear powers have shaped the path for India’s engagement with the global nuclear community. It then outlines the challenges facing the country in concluding and implementing these agreements, and offers specific policy recommendations as India pursues other agreements in the future even as it nurtures its status in the changing world order. 

The doctrine: 

India’s nuclear doctrine can be summarized as follows:

• Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent;
• A posture of “No First Use” nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere;
• Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.
• Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority.
• Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states;
• However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons;
• A continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile related materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations, and continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests.
• Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear diplomacy and India: controversies and relations

Voluntary restriction on Nuclear Testing – also described as safe guard moratorium on nuclear testing. In order to define liability in case of nuclear accident a law will be passed.

The indo-US nuclear deal is popularly described as 1 2 3 agreement because it was signed as per section 1 2 3 of the US atomic energy act 1954. The section says if a country has signed an NPT and US president is satisfied then US can share nuclear technology for peaceful use, in case of India the problem was it has not adopted NPT therefore in 2006 US amended section 1 2 3 through Hyde act which removed the requirement of NPT, the deal was concluded in 2007 and ratified by the Indian parliament in 2008.

The highlights of agreement are –

1. The US will supply nuclear fuel to India rather it will help in maintaining the strategic reserves of Uranium i.e. at least one-year fuel in advance for the reactors in the civil category, in case the US is not able to fulfill requirement then it will ask others to supply the nuclear fuel.
2.  The US will give India a nuclear reactor one of their suppliers is exporting 6 reactors for Kovvada in Andhra Pradesh.
3. The US was very reluctant to allow the reprocessing of the spent fuel. Their argument was that such a facility is not been extended to any country.

   The text of agreement says India will set up a centralized reprocessing facility where the spent fuel of all the 14 reactors will be brought and it should be safeguard with IAEA.

US was looking to establish a connection between termination of deal and nuclear testing, which was outrightly rejected by India. The agreement says that if India conducts the nuclear test then US will try to understand the circumstances that will be followed by negotiation b/w two countries which should conclude within a year.

Any of two, terminate the deal by giving one-year notice in advance. The deal is reviewed annually by the US president.

Implication of the deal –

1. India’s nuclear isolation was broken.
2. Access to the latest nuclear technology which is vital for energy security.
3. Recognition as a country with nuclear weapon.
4. Retaining the right of conducting the nuclear test.
5. De-hyphenation of India-Pakistan by USA.

Indo-Japan Nuclear deal

India is only non-NPT country with whom Japan has signed the nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement was finalised in Nov-2016. This deal was important for two reasons-

1. Japan along with China and Russia enjoyed the monopoly over the steel which requires the core of the Nuclear reactor.
2. The French supplier Areva is controlled by Mitsubishi, general electric, and Westinghouse of USA are controlled by Hitachi and Toshiba respectively, in the absence of an agreement with Japan the French and American suppliers would have failed to get the consent for supplying the nuclear reactor. When the negotiation started with Japan, they proposed highly unrealistic conditions that India has to make unequivocal conditions that it will never conduct the nuclear test. This was refused by India rather it was insisting on 1 2 3 models.

Following the Fukushima accident in 2011, the talks got suspended. Later when they were resumed India changed the proposal from purchasing the steel to purchase of reactors. The nuclear agreement with Japan has two set of documents –

1. Notes on views and understanding, it carries two commitments by India
   • No first use
   • Voluntary restricting on nuclear testing
2. The second set of documents is the main agreement. According to Japan, both the document was binding whereas the Indian position is that only main agreement is binding. Japan is trying to establish a connection b/w the conduction of the nuclear test and the termination of the nuclear deal. India can not accept this interpretation because then the others will also start demanding similar provisions and one more possible is negative fallout is the dilution of predictability among the nuclear agreement which might hurt the prospect of NSG membership.

Given the geopolitical scenario where the US is withdrawing and China is expanding it is highly unlikely that Japan will do anything to undermine India’s position. Realistically India will conduct the nuclear test if China carries out some serious provocation, given the fact that China is as big a security threat to Japan as it is to India, Japan will have a sympathetic view.

According to the agreement Indian companies and their Japanese counterpart will form the joint venture to built nuclear reactors. This arrangement will facilitate the transfer of technology. India will reprocess the spent fuel for Japan, this is how the japan has been made a stack holder in the process of having the NSG membership.

India-France

India and France have had a long history of cooperation since the 1950s. The two have shared a strategic partnership through diplomatic exchanges and bilateral meetings on trade and civil nuclear energy. France has been instrumental in India’s nuclear technology progress. The French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) offered technical cooperation to India on civil nuclear innovation in 1950, which materialised in 1951, with the two countries signing a bilateral agreement “for the research and construction of beryllium-moderated reactors”. France has continued to be a strong supporter to India in terms of enhancing global nuclear cooperation. Following India’s 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion, France emerged as the only western country to commend the event, pointing to it as a reflection of India’s advancement in the nuclear sector. However, France insisted on ensuring that their supply of nuclear materials was not used in any future nuclear explosions by India.

India-Russia

The nuclear cooperation between India and Russia dates back to the 1960s, when India and the then Soviet Union signed several agreements. In the first 10 years, these agreements were focused on scientific and technical cooperation, such as in the realm of facilitating the exchange of scholars. Within the nuclear domain, the first substantive bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement between India and the Soviet Union was signed after India’s Pokhran-I. The Soviet Union agreed to supply heavy water for the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS-I&II) through a bilateral agreement signed in September 1976. Previously, Canada had supplied the heavy water, but with the creation of the NSG and India’s 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion, Canada withdrew its obligations towards India. In November 1988, a deal was signed with the Soviet Union for the construction of a nuclear power station made up of two “pressurized light water reactors, of 1000 MWe each.” Throughout the 1990s, Russia remained a key supplier of nuclear fuel to India, during a time of limited progress in India’s engagement with the global nuclear architecture.

On 5 December 2008, the two countries signed an agreement for the construction of four additional units at Kudankulam and on developing new sites. Russia welcomed India’s decision to set up a ‘Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership’ that was established in 2010 and agreed to discuss future cooperation with this Centre. In conjunction with Kudankulam, India agreed to identify a second site to expedite the possibility of further cooperation with Russia and also strive to collaborate on at least 12 units in the next 20 years. Both India and Russia also agreed to consider cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with third countries.

India-Namibia

India signed a pact with Namibia in September 2009, to initiate the supply of Uranium to New Delhi. Namibia, being a part of the Pelindaba Treaty (also known as the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, ANWFZT), is barred from supplying uranium to a non-NPT signatory. As a result of this, the agreement between the two countries has faced various setbacks. In order to ratify the agreement, Namibia suggested that it would be beneficial for India to establish similar deals with other signatories to convince the ANWFZT members. An experience to learn from in this regard is India’s civil nuclear agreement with Argentina, which is a signatory to the Tlatelolco Treaty (also known as the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, LANWFZT), similar to the ANWFZT. However, the LANWFZT does not specifically bar its members from engaging in nuclear trade for peaceful purposes. Given the NSG waiver and India’s track record, there is scope for New Delhi to convince African countries to adopt similar approaches to their engagements with India.

India-Russia-Bangladesh (A Tripartite Agreement)

A momentous first for India was the signing of a tripartite agreement with Russia and Bangladesh to work together on the Rooppur Nuclear Power plant in Bangladesh. The landmark deal was signed in March 2018 and signaled a shift in India’s acceptance in the global nuclear community as a responsible nuclear power. The NPCIL is the commanding authority from the Indian side to assist in the construction, installation and also work in capacity building, as well as provide support to Russia which will take the lead in designing, manufacturing and supply of equipment and construction of the facility.

This is the first initiative under the India-Russia deal where both countries decided to undertake an atomic energy project in a third country. This project also signaled significant strides in the issues of liability that had risen previously, as in the India-US agreement. Rosatom developed this project on a turnkey basis that would make the contractor liable for issues arising in the plant. Furthering the importance of safe use of nuclear energy, this project has been developed using ‘post-Fukushima’ safety standards.

This is the first nuclear reactor in Bangladesh, and the third in Southeast Asia, after those in India and Pakistan. While India has been steadily undertaking strategic agreements with major powers like the US, Russia and Japan, this agreement marks the first project that New Delhi is undertaking on foreign soil, signifying India’s deeper involvement in the global civil nuclear sector. It has also given a huge boost to the country’s ‘Make in India’ initiative by proposing the production of some nuclear equipment for the plant in domestic shores. This agreement is also important in the context of India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy, making its role in South Asia noteworthy. It is a major step in achieving the objectives of non-reciprocity towards India’s smaller neighbours in South Asia as highlighted in the Gujral doctrine, furthering India’s status as a responsible nuclear power. It will also help India in realising other strategic objectives, including for instance, a free-transit agreement with Bangladesh which will reduce its dependence on the Siliguri Corridor (also known as Chicken’s neck) and contribute towards the development of the northeastern region.

Challenges ahead

A key challenge to India’s civil nuclear engagements with other countries is its status as a non-signatory to the NPT. In turn, two key barriers to India’s acceptance within the global non-proliferation regime has been India’s nuclear weapons programme, and its strained relationship with its neighbour Pakistan (which is similarly a nuclear weapons state). Several existing regional and international agreements bar the engagement of its signatories with non-NPT nuclear weapons states like India. Although the NSG has granted India a clean waiver, improving its ability to engage with key nuclear energy players, barriers remain that restrict its ability to realise the full potential of civil nuclear cooperation with the global community.

A second challenge that India has to confront is its experience with the 1984 Bhopal tragedy. As India was debating its nuclear liability law, the Supreme Court verdict on the Bhopal gas tragedy had just come out and it shaped the nature of the ensuing debates. There was a strong backlash against the establishment of civil nuclear power plants, as critics argued that there was a lack of adequate compensation for the victims of the Bhopal tragedy. Indeed, the issue of liabilities continues to be a challenge for India in its further engagements with other countries for civil nuclear trade. As highlighted by the concern surrounding the application of internationally established frameworks and India’s own domestic liability laws in the India-US agreement, a similar challenge could potentially arise in the future as India negotiates agreements with other partners.

A third major challenge faced by India and the global community alike is the safety of nuclear and non-nuclear materials. With institutions like the IAEA in place, the driving concern for countries entering into civil nuclear agreements with India has been the threat of nuclear disasters like Chernobyl and Fukushima. The Fukushima tragedy in Japan—a country which is technologically advanced—triggered global concern about nuclear safety. Although it was primarily caused by natural factors, anthropogenic factors like the failure of not only the cooling system but also the containment of radioactive release resulted in the evacuation of over a 100,000 people, bringing the city to a standstill.

Concerns regarding nuclear safety have also led to protests in the domestic front. These protests have been a result of multiple concerns, such as diversion of water to the plants, environmental degradation, land acquisition, as well as issues of rehabilitation. For instance, in 1990, soon after the Kudankulam project in the state of Tamil Nadu was announced, a protest was held by nearby residents, opposing the diversion of water for the reactors from the Pechiparai dam in the Kanyakumari district. Operating in a post-Fukushima world, there were a series of concerns surrounding the safety of the Kudankulam plant which led to further protests. Nearly a couple of thousands of protestors were arrested and charged with sedition.

Similarly, the Jaitapur power plant in Ratnagiri in the state of Maharashtra (being built as a part of the 2008 India-France agreement) was opposed on the grounds that it would destroy some 938 hectares of eco-sensitive land. A similar issue arose when in January 2018, the Ministry of Environment and Forest asked the National Green Tribunal to shift a proposed 6,000-MW nuclear plant — the first under the 2008 Indo-US civil nuclear agreement— from the coastal district of Gujarat to Kovvada in Andhra Pradesh “on account of delay in land acquisition at Chhaya-Mithivirdi site”. The protests also led to delays in the projects, which increased the cost of project implementation.

Conclusion 

The growing concerns around nuclear safety and security have pushed developed countries away from their long dependence on nuclear energy. For developing countries like India, however, the choice between one source of energy over another is not as easy, given growing energy requirements and persistent development challenges. Therefore, priority should be accorded to the continued development of safe mechanisms for the use of nuclear energy.

It is important for India to undertake a proactive role in establishing and improving global mechanisms through bilateral engagements and multilateral conversations so that states that are engaged in the civil nuclear industry are guided by strict guidelines and regulations. In addition to establishing new mechanisms or reinforcing existing ones, India should also undertake public outreach efforts that would assuage concerns not only in the domestic context, but also of those of the nuclear supplier countries. Outlining civil nuclear engagement policies as well as India’s own nuclear security policies even in broad template could remove many suspicions and concerns of India’s nuclear security policies and practices.

In the case of liability issues, India’s approach has been to come up with specific solutions on a case-to-case basis. Curated solutions for the challenges were crucial in the success of India’s engagements, as seen in the Rooppur Project in Bangladesh and the signing of the India-US 123 agreement. Liability continues to remain a big challenge and therefore, with India’s past experience, it is important to acknowledge the lessons learned and incorporate them into practice in negotiating future agreements. The application of international liability frameworks can remove the concerns of many supplier parties who may otherwise have been disincentivised by the Indian domestic liability law.

With regard to safety issues, India must address domestic and international concerns at an institutional as well as project level. To address potential concerns that may arise during bilateral negotiations, robust practices must be established to deal with nuclear safety concerns. At a domestic level, public participation should be incorporated at the planning stage, through initial studies relating to impact on environment, water balance and waste management systems; as well as issues of rehabilitation and resettlement. An example of ensuring safety through an institutional mechanism is the Environmental Impact Assessment under Environmental Protection Act, 1986 which not only addresses the safety concerns but also emphasises a participatory approach. Furthermore, emergency plans prepared by the Atomic Energy agencies needs to be made available to the public. These plans must be revised frequently and training exercises with police should be conducted.

Nuclear cooperation has brought a new dimension to India’s diplomacy in the 21^st century. India’s status as a responsible nuclear power is partly predicated upon its civil nuclear relationships established with major powers, despite not being a signatory to the NPT and without being a member of the NSG. Although India’s civil nuclear engagements with the global community have strengthened its position in the global civil nuclear order, there is a need for the country to push for greater engagements with more key suppliers and stakeholders to fulfill its civil nuclear potential and assert its status as a responsible nuclear state.